Американская военная машина. Глубинная политика, глобальная связь ЦРУ с наркотиками и путь в Афганистан - Peter Dale Scott
136. Marchetti and Marks, CIA and the Cult, 383.
137. Hersh, The Old Boys, 301, quoting Polly (Mrs. Clayton) Fritchey. Other men prominent in the cabal responsible for Operation Paper were also Republican activists. One was Paul Helliwell, who became very prominent in Florida Republican Party politics, thanks in part to funds he received from Thailand as the Thai consul general in Miami. Harry Anslinger was a staunch Republican and owed his appointment as the first director of the FBN to his marriage to a niece of the Republican Party magnate (and Treasury Secretary) Andrew Mellon (Valentine, The Strength of the Wolf, 16). Donovan, married to a New York heiress and an OPC consultant in the late Truman years, had a lifelong history of activism in New York Republican Party politics.
138. A perhaps unanswerable deep historical question is whether some of these men, and especially Helliwell, were aware that KMT profits from the revived drug traffic out of Burma were funding the China Lobby’s heavy attack on the Truman administration in general and on Dean Acheson and George C. Marshall in particular. (We shall see that in the later 1950s, Donovan and Helliwell received funds from Phao Sriyanon for the lobbying of Congress, supplanting those of the moribund China Lobby. Cf. Fineman, A Special Relationship, 214–15.) Citing John Loftus and others, Anthony Summers has written that Allen Dulles, before joining the CIA, had contributed to the young Richard Nixon’s first election campaign and possibly had also supplied him with the explosive information that made Nixon famous: that former State Department officer Alger Hiss had known the communist Whittaker Chambers (Anthony Summers with Robbyn Swann, The Arrogance of Power: The Secret World of Richard Nixon [New York: Viking, 2000], 62–63).
139. Sydney Souers (the first director of central intelligence or DCI, Central Intelligence Group, 1946) was born in Dayton, Ohio. Hoyt Vandenberg (director, Central Intelligence Group, 1946–1947) was born in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Roscoe Hillenkoetter (the third DCI and first director of the CIA, 1947–1949) was born in St. Louis. Walter Bedell Smith (the fourth DCI, 1949–1953) was born in Indianapolis.
140. For the details, see Scott, The War Conspiracy, 261. The one from Boston, Robert Amory, was no less Social Register, and his brother, Cleveland Amory, wrote a best-seller, Who Killed Society, 1960).
141. Weiner, Legacy of Ashes, 52–53. It may be relevant that Bedell Smith himself was a right-wing Republican who reportedly once told Eisenhower that Nelson Rockefeller “was a Communist” (Smith, OSS, 367).
142. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 165–78; cf. Trento, The Secret History of the CIA, 71.
143. McCoy, Politics of Heroin, 184.
144. Darrell Berrigan, “They Smuggle Drugs by the Ton,” Saturday Evening Post, May 5, 1956, 42.
145. “Thailand: Not Rogue Cops but a Rogue System,” a statement by the Asian Human Rights Commission, AHRC-STM-031-2008, January 31, 2008, http://www
.ahrchk.net/statements/mainfile.php/2008statements/1359.
Chapter 4: Rollback, PARU, and Laos
1. Richard Helms to American Society of Newspaper Editors, 1971, quoted in Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books/Chicago Review Press, 2001), 477.
2. Interview with Alfred McCoy by David Barsamian, February 17, 1990, http://www.lycaeum.org/drugwar/DARKALLIANCE/ciah3.html.
3. Eisenhower, in his first State of the Union Address in January 1953, threatened to “unleash Chiang.” But two years of problems over the KMT drug forces in Burma meant that both Chiang Kai-shek and his friend Chennault had lost favor with Washington bureaucrats. By 1953 an emerging consensus in Washington feared that the KMT scandal was contributing to the influence of communism in Burma and damaging U.S. interests. See FRUS, 1952–1954, vol. 12, pt. 2 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office), 13–19, 46–49, 53–62.
4. Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), vol. 1, 85; cf. David Kaiser, American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press/Belknap Press, 2000), 11.
5. Summary of PSB D-23, Top Secret, “U.S. Psychological Strategy Based on Thailand,” September 14, 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954, vol. 12, pt. 2, 688–91. The complete document has never been published. It is contained in NARA, PSB Files, lot 62 D 333, file PSB D-23, also in the C. D. Jackson Records, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Series I, PSB-OCB Series, 1953–1954, box 1. Fineman summarizes and quotes from an earlier version of PSB D-23 in the Eisenhower Library, dated July 2; this copy is still sanitized with respect to Indochina (Daniel Fineman, A Special Relationship: The United States and Military Government in Thailand, 1947–1958 [Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1997], 170–73, 299–300).
6. William O. Walker III, Opium and Foreign Policy: The Anglo-American Search for Order in Asia, 1912–1954 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 209.
7. Fineman, A Special Relationship, 170 (drafted); Carl Bernstein, “The CIA and the Media,” Rolling Stone, October 20, 1977, 63, quoted in Peter Dale Scott, Deep Politics and the Death of JFK (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 55 (Luce).
8. This reflects the Gladio strategy of stay-behind forces that was already being instituted in Europe and Turkey.
9. FRUS, 1952–1954, vol. 12, pt. 2, 689; Fineman, A Special Relationship, 172. In Fineman’s words, PSB D23 is “based on a variety of truths, half-truths, misconceptions, and outright falsehoods.” As he points out, the PSB D-23 strategy ended up supporting the non-Thai Hmong against the Tai-speaking lowland Lao. In retrospect this talk of the “ethnic bonds of the Thai peoples” makes about as much sense as developing a World War II strategy based on the “ethnic bonds”
